By Ian Ross
A critical evaluation of the counter fraud and corruption
strategy of a public sector organisation and a discussion to advocate reforms
to it that would enhance its effectiveness.
This article will provide an evaluation of a public sector
counter fraud and corruption strategy and highlight its strengths and
weaknesses, dealing in priority with its weaknesses and with focus on the need
to reform it. As a base of understanding we will first summarise the meaning of
what constitutes the
‘public sector’ and then detail the defining constituents of
its counter corruption strategy, which will be followed by an account of my
understanding of the reforms necessary of the counter strategy of my chosen
organisation.
In contrast to the private sector, the public sector
essentially is funded by the taxpayer. The public sector is made up as an
institution of organisations offering public services in differing areas of
public amenity support and outputs. A wide range of services make up the public
sector; from the National Health Service (NHS), social security and benefits,
education and transport, to the police, local government and defence, et al.
Public services have emerged from what were previously voluntary tasks by
charities and religious organisations. With the growth and expansion and
immense legal consolidation, the public sector came to be recognised as the
pillars of the state. The key aims are to provide social and welfare support to
citizens and consequently large amounts of statutory regulatory and
procedurally driven legislation has been passed to both administrate and
enforce certain elements of it. An enormous differing and cyclic phenomenon,
the public sector attempts to address these issues in terms of how the
different services are funded, managed and to whom they are accountable. A
definition of the public sector was provided by Jones (2004 p.23) as
‘continually provided goods and services paid for by taxation or other revenues
raised by law’.
My chosen public sector organisation is the police force
(United Kingdom). One would at least hope that as with all counter fraud and
corruption strategies in the public sector, the strategy to counter police
corruption would be robust and capable of complete enforcement, as opposed to
being a mere theoretical or ‘paper’ policy product. Underlying causes of
dissatisfaction as identified by Harrison and Cuneen (2000) is also supported
by many academics and writers on this issue, asserted by the quote by Lambert
about the inadequacies of the civilian supervisory model:
‘No system, however elaborate, which concentrates on
supervision and ex post facto review of police investigations will satisfy the
demand that justice will only be seen to be done when the investigation of
complaints against the police is taken out of the hands of the police
themselves.
Harrison and Cuneen (2000, Liberty p.6.-1.7)
Shaping the discussion to deal with the evaluation of the
police corruption strategy, it would first be useful to summarise an account of
the meaning of corruption. Defining corruption is relatively simple because a
definition for corruption was created in 1889 by reference to the common law
offence of bribery and the statutory office committed contrary to Public Bodies
Corrupt Practices Act 1889, passed to deal with corruption in office which
later enabled the Prevention of Corruption Act[s] of 1906 and 1916 which created
two new ‘alternate’ offences to deal with bribery committed by Agents or bribes
given to Agents. The police force is seen the principle law enforcement
organisation with a duty of care and as such ought to be the doyen of trust and
integrity.
But the problem of police corruption cannot be explained
within just a constricted legal framework and such narrow terms of reference.
This is because there are numerous academic definitions of police corruption
and equally diverse explanations of what actually constitutes corruption. Some
authors centre their explanations of corruption as purely criminal conduct (as
defined within the criminal law) whilst others open the debate to much wider
topics and methods of corruption, including favouritism and nepotism, abuse of
power, racism, bribery, case manipulation (abuse of legal process) malpractice
and the use of police informants. Newburn (1999) probed more deeply into the
matter of defining police corruption in that police corruption is conduct that
is mutually exclusive of actual criminal conduct. For example, stealing would
not be corruption but wrongful ethical behaviour, the professional ‘grey areas’
would be. Interestingly therefore Newburn and like-minded authors effectively
set a challenge to policy makers in setting out a counter corruption strategy
by virtue of the fact that they seek to capture all wrongful behaviour. Conduct
or behaviour which could not be easily which was passed off as ‘sharp practice’
or which gives ‘cause for concern’ is swept into the meaning of police
corruption – and rightly so. Legislation is not enough and the range of
attitudes; even the connivance or tacit tolerance of police corruption from
within their own ranks and senior officers, is a facet of the police corruption
itself and rankles the public and the public good.
Counter corruption strategy governing and supporting the
police force is difficult to identify with any immediacy. This is because the
huge range and array of corrupt practices now espoused and referenced by
Newburn (those not ‘legislated’ for) along with wider definitions and
explanations provided by
Roebuck and Barker (1974) with an open definition and
Quinton and Miller (2003) who structured their definition and which made wider
connections; to leaking information, obtaining money or sexual favours from the
public and then returning to the remit of the criminal law, direct conspiracy
with criminals to commit crimes.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is now
the principal authority which deals with police corruption. The IPCC has
succeeded several establishments, some defined by statute. Predecessors of the
IPCC were deemed to be a failure became of low success rates in detecting
corruption, added to the manifest problem of police culture which stems a deep
distrust and lack of faith in the police investigating themselves. This in turn
led to a conclusion of the investigations themselves being questionable and not
trusted but becoming also being a defining characteristic of police corruption.
The IPCC was created by the Home Office to investigate and
monitor complaints against police. This gives an immediate message of the
counter corruption strategy being reactive instead of proactive. Also,
notwithstanding its central placing concerning police wrongdoing it is still
difficult to see beyond the overall role of the IPCC being a mere facilitator
when it comes to forming counter corruption strategy. It is acknowledged that
the IPCC have successfully investigated notable cases of corruption and secured
eventual criminal prosecutions involving police officers and support staff but
one must search extensively and deeply to find a strategy which sets out to
marginalise corruption in the police force.
One notable success however for the IPCC was to engage with
the Children’s Legal Centre. This led to an updated and hugely improved
procedure to deal with complaints from children which even contained a section
in the report to identify areas for future improvement (Hamilton and Sherwood:
2006).
However since the inception of the IPCC as an independent
organisation, there is no tangible evidence provided by them that any part of
their policy sets the belief that continued and systematic engagement and
working strategies will ‘naturally’ help them to create good governance
frameworks that imbue both an anti-corruption culture, and help to review and
implement policies which will marginalise fraudulent and corrupt behaviour and
networked activities. The current strategy of the IPCC provides an impactive
image to the public of ‘professional standards’ which are et al, police
officers are honest, act with integrity and do not compromise or abuse their
position, treat information with respect and access or disclose it only in the
proper course of police duties, report and challenge or take action against the
conduct of colleagues which has fallen below the standards of professional
behaviour expected. The last example is probably the most challenging. This is
the grey area and in part alludes to ‘whistle blowing’.
The notoriety in the public sector of whistleblowers being
hounded, interlinked with the collaboration culture in the public services adds
credence to the evidence that the police are more concerned about getting power
for themselves than supporting victims of crime. Moreover, the Home Office
report on police overtime published in February 2010 shows ‘concern’ about the
dubious ways police overtime is effectively contrived and millions of pounds
extracted from the public purse in many forces. One particular force where such
malpractice was endemic was helpfully anonimised by the Home Office. Thus the
IPCC and their counterparts in the National Policing Improvements Agency (NPIA)
are badly in need of strengthening because they have done little to dispel the
reputation of the senior command and officers of forces having a ‘couldn’t care
less attitude’ towards police corruption per se and more importantly, to the
victims of it – the taxpayer. Limited understanding of what police corruption
can fully consist of, or selective acknowledgement of, or inconsistent dealing
with corruption is a culture still indulged by many Chief Constables. This is
ably abetted by the cluster of ACPO policy which has closed many doors to
justice for victims.
The inevitable effect on a strategy intended to deter
corruption is clear to see. If such notions and patterns of behaviour exist yet
the force itself remains aloof from the problems. The police commonly state
that they are practitioners and ‘leave the law to the lawyers’ holds equal
meaning to the entity that the IPCC are viewed as not just having pole
responsibility for dealing with police corruption, but also abandoned to its
politics, its methods and peculiar influences in why it occurs and the idiom
which varies so much that many officers and staff have difficulty understanding
that what they are doing is corrupt.
As one finite example the issue of dubious police overtime,
the paying of police informants to ‘turn’ criminals into witnesses or even
write them out of a case altogether, on these examples only, we must understand
that just as a fraudster, when this is happening, the mind which schemes in
corruption is in a nigh-on permanent state of denial.
To
another example, but in stark contrast to illustrate this point, is the case of
the Metropolitan Police commander Ali Dizaei, a corrupt police officer with a
long history of corruption of varied serious criminal conduct in the force,
including drug dealing and leaking police information to criminals for payment.
Sent to prison eventually, yet astonishingly he has not (at the time of
writing) been dismissed by the force which time and again, overlooked serious evidence against
him because it feared that Dizaei would instinctively and immediately accuse
the force of being racist. Dizaei knew he could push the boundaries and how to
use the forces’ fear of appearing racist to make it difficult to investigate
him. Dizaei rose through the ranks despite severe reservations about his
character and conduct, was constantly making loud proclamations about the
‘cancer of racism’ within the force, and with that activity, always poised to
sue for discrimination. Investigations into his criminality were halted on the
orders of the highest authorities within the force. Dizaei was at one point
untouchable, and de-facto could do no wrong.
The Dizaei case is the epitome, the quintessence of
institutional police corruption, but a perverse and twisted example because of
a feeble police counter corruption attitudes and made worse by a total
abandonment of responsibility by the Metropolitan police force as a public
sector organisation, and murky political influences. Dizaei believed that he
could get away with anything because he was not white, and this case is also,
for the purposes of this evaluation, a clear indicator of the near total
failure and even refusal by the police and related authorities to pursue any
form of counter corruption strategy. Too scared politically event to follow
their own processes.
Police corruption in the UK is now so entrenched and
widespread within the service that it is now equal in incidence with most
third-world countries (Seed and Palmar, 1998) and the strategies to counter it.
Key points of the weaknesses of the current IPCC strategy is that the IPCC
whilst it investigates well after the fact, is a lustrous purveyor of mission
statements, guidance to the public and assurances. In fact the IPCC in its
statutory guidance to the police service and police authorities on the handling
of complaints presents a dominant point of zero tolerance of discrimination,
‘ensuring a diverse approach’ and clear processes for the public to make
complaints. This in fact shows a typically political dominance of police
policy, highlighted especially by the Dizaei case. But what is evident also, is
that the authorities who lead the counter corruption strategy are fragmented in
this regard. There is no overall strategy to include all identifiable corrupt
activity and further intricacies and problems can be inferred from the IPCC
operational advice note (2009): ‘the police have an obligation to preserve
evidence so that it is available for the IPCC to enable it to conduct an
effective investigation. At the same time a force should not act in a manner
that might compromise the independence of the investigation. ‘ Likewise, the
regulations governing the conduct of IPCC investigations, one of which being;
‘Before the arrival of IPCC investigators on the scene [of a crime] police
officers shall ensure that the scene is secured in a manner that is consistent
with the need to preserve all evidence relevant to the investigation of the
complaint.’
(Harrison and Cuneen: 2000).
With that are proven cases of the police officer in London
in 2009 who was allegedly responsible for the death of Ian Cousins during the
summer disturbances in connection with the UK and global recession.
The police tactics of ‘kettling’ was the central controversy
of that incident, but after the incident the
Metropolitan Police claimed that there was no CCTV footage
available of the incident when Mr Cousins collapsed and died in the street when
assaulted by police officers. One police officer at the centre of that case, PC
Simon Harwood was cleared of manslaughter on a majority verdict. This officer
had been previously investigated a number of times for alleged violence and
misconduct. In a string of incidents Harwood was accused of having punched,
throttled, kneed or threatened other suspects while in uniform. One complaint was
upheld, yet Harwood was allowed back into the Metropolitan Police - against the
advice of the IPCC.
The outrage and inevitable accusation of destroying or
suppressing evidence followed (the covering up and closing ranks was the
corruption and the IPCC relied on the police who seemingly sabotaged the
investigation from the outset). The shooting of Jean Charles De Mendez, not so
much the shooting but the police tampering with photographic evidence of the
suspect to make him look more like Mendez in a deliberate attempt to mislead a
coroners’ court. These incidents along with the preceding points of evaluation,
stresses a collective point that the current strategy is deeply flawed and the
actual process puts too much trust in the police, ironically instigating an
investigation against their own. There is little doubt that the police force
needs additional people to address corruption and this reminds us how
heuristics in the police force, if not set in firm ethical and foundations will
inevitably stray back to police cultural norms of collusion and
self-protection.
Successive government have tried and failed, to impose
standards of management and accountability such as are taken for granted in the
private sector and large parts of the public sector. The last attempt at
wholesale change which could have improved the image of the force in corruption
cases was prompted by Sir Patrick Sheehy's report in 1994. This was welcomed by
many outsiders, but met with complete hostility from the Police Federation and
nearly all senior officers. Likewise police authorities are ineffectual
monitors of their local forces, so there is little chance of ferreting out
corruption as the constant inner cyclic political forces at play are never
still long enough to settle the problems of police corruption and ‘strategy’
successes are sporadic hits on corrupt officers whilst day-to-day corruption is
widespread and constant.
In my evaluation also, there is a chronic weakness in middle
management. It can be dismaying that the response of police officers to almost
any problem is to invent a new form for solving it. They work in a
fantastically bureaucratised system, in some ways forced upon them by centrally
imposed targets, so one could even argue that certain elements of police
corruption are a natural product of the organisation and the pressures it
creates.
Societal shifts will also form the crux of recommendations
of reforms of the counter corruption strategy, meaning advances in technology,
creating new opportunities of corruption and sophisticated criminal activity
meets firmly with the police force day-to-day; that is in the world that is
characterised by employment insecurity and the primacy of economic goals,
drivers of corruption are as diverse as the acts themselves.
A standard and consistent (compulsory) external training
programme should be provided to all involved in the police complaints
processes. The training should raise the standard of understanding the civil
against criminal outcome dilemma in dealing with corruption cases, namely if
the conduct warrants a criminal case or the case is disposed of by other
resolutions and case outcomes. This area is the one most often confused at
present and misunderstood to do nothing at all. An overriding ‘police
corruption Act’ would be necessary with a dominant regularly function (as per
the current Bribery Bill 2010) to impose conformance of strategy in reporting
corruption and an offence of negligently allowing or permitting corruption to
take place. But more importantly, behind that, to remove the excuses and loop
holes exploited by senior police officers as do politicians, about the rules
not being clear and that it is someone else’s problem (such as the IPCC who do
not get the precise co-operation they ought to have). But of key importance, a
statutory requirement to overcome the nonsense identified by the IPCC
themselves concerning the obligation to preserve evidence for the IPCC. Such
police conduct suppressing evidence and incapacitating IPCC or other
investigations as in the De Mendes and Cousins cases, should constitute
criminal offences in their own right. This is because at present the police
cannot be trusted to support the IPCC and merely use the IPCC as a fake flag of
independence in having complaints handled – especially complaints about
corruption.
Finally, overblown political dominance should be a specific
target of deliberation. Political agendas should not be allowed to rule over
justice.
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